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THE PROBLEMS WITH THE REPORTER’S
PRIVILEGE
RANDALL D. ELIASON

*

INTRODUCTION
At this writing, the United States Congress is closer than ever to
1
passing a federal reporter’s privilege or shield law. The law would,
with some exceptions, shield journalists from being compelled to
testify concerning the identity of their confidential sources and other
information gathered during the course of their work. Privilege
advocates frame their arguments with lofty rhetoric about the free
press and the First Amendment, implying that support for the
privilege ranks right up there with support for baseball and apple
2
pie. But it is important to look beyond the rhetoric and examine
* Professorial Lecturer in Law, American University, Washington College of Law
and George Washington University Law School. The author was an Assistant United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia for twelve years and served as Chief of
the Public Corruption/Government Fraud Section from 1999–2001. This Article is a
compilation and elaboration of points made during the Symposium by both myself
and Professor Steven Clymer—points that each of us has made elsewhere. See Free
Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52–63 (2007) (testimony of Randall Eliason, Professorial
Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School); Reporters’ Privilege
Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16–18, 85–93 (2006) (testimony of Steven D. Clymer,
Professor, Cornell Law School); Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate
Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385
(2006).
1. The House of Representatives passed the federal shield law, the Free Flow of
Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, on October 16, 2007 by a vote of 398 to 21. The
Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Senate version of the law, S. 2035, on
October 22, 2007, and sent it to the full Senate for consideration.
2. Quotes from the founding fathers are always popular to demonstrate the
fundamental rightness of one’s cause. For example, privilege advocates Dr. James
Tucker and Professor Stephen Wermiel quote Thomas Jefferson as saying that “our
liberty . . . cannot be guarded but by the freedom of the press, nor that be limited
without danger of losing it.” James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting a
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exactly what a shield law would and would not accomplish. Contrary
to popular belief, it is possible to cherish the First Amendment and
the free press and still think the reporter’s privilege is a bad idea.
Underlying the arguments in favor of the shield law are a number
of claims about the current legal landscape involving subpoenas to
journalists, the potential effect of a shield law, and the behavior of
reporters and confidential sources. Repeated uncritically and widely
assumed to be true, these claims are an accepted part of the narrative
surrounding the supposed need for a privilege. Closer examination,
however, reveals that these claims rest on a shaky or even nonexistent foundation. I would like to discuss what I believe are eight
myths surrounding the need for, and effect of, a reporter’s privilege.
Once these myths are exposed, the privilege is revealed for what it is:
a flawed, unnecessary piece of legislation that will not accomplish its
goals.
MYTH #1: THERE IS CURRENTLY AN INTOLERABLE FLOOD OF
SUBPOENAS BEING ISSUED TO JOURNALISTS
There is one fact that almost everyone involved in the privilege
debate seems to accept as a given: reporters today are being
subpoenaed at an unprecedented clip, resulting in a crisis within the
journalism community.
As far back as 1999, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press was lamenting that journalists
3
were “drowning in a sea of subpoenas.” A witness before the House
Judiciary Committee in 2007 declared that there has been a “deluge”
4
of subpoenas to reporters in recent years. But despite the watery
metaphors, one searching for evidence of this crisis will come up dry.

Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 Am. U. L. Rev.
1291, 1294 [hereinafter Tucker & Wermiel]. But the issue is not whether freedom of
the press is a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy. We can all agree that it is.
The issue is whether a reporter’s shield law is really important to the free press, and
whether the arguments in favor of the law stand up to critical scrutiny.
And just to show that the founding fathers are not taking sides, I note that
Jefferson also said, “Advertisements . . . contain the only truths to be relied on in a
newspaper,” and “The man who reads nothing at all is better educated than the man
who reads nothing but newspapers.” See The Quotations Page: Journalism,
http://www.quotationspage.com/subects/journalism (last visited May 16, 2008). It’s
probably hard to say how Mr. Jefferson would have come down on the question of a
special legal privilege for reporters.
3. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY: A
REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 1997, at 1
(1999).
4. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 32 (2007) [hereinafter H.R. 2102 Hearing]
(testimony of Lee Levine, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP).
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Indeed, it is remarkable how little factual support there is for this
5
claim, given how widely it is assumed to be true.
It is true that there has been a handful of high-profile cases in the
past few years involving subpoenas to reporters. These include the
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) leak/Valerie Plame investigation
where former New York Times reporter Judith Miller went to jail for
6
refusing to identify a source; the case involving grand jury subpoenas
to two reporters from the San Francisco Chronicle for information
concerning their source for stories on the Bay Area Laboratory Co-

5. Thirty-six years ago in the landmark case of Branzburg v. Hayes reporters made
the same argument, claiming that the number of subpoenas to the press was
increasing and that the privilege was needed more than ever. 408 U.S. 665, 699
(1972). In Branzburg, a closely divided Supreme Court held that reporters do not
have a privilege under the First Amendment to refuse to testify in grand jury
proceedings concerning their confidential sources. Id. at 667.
Branzburg was a 5-4 decision, with the majority opinion written by Justice White.
Justice Powell, who joined Justice White’s opinion, also wrote what his dissenting
colleagues called an “enigmatic” concurrence, id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting),
suggesting that there might be some protection for reporters if a grand jury
investigation was being conducted in bad faith. Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Over the years, privilege advocates have often mischaracterized the Branzburg
holding as a plurality opinion, and have urged courts to recognize a privilege based
on Justice Powell’s concurrence. See Frontline: News War: Interview with James Goodale
(PBS television broadcast Oct. 21, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/goodale.html (describing litigation strategy of
using Justice Powell’s concurrence to argue that Branzburg actually upheld the
privilege). Unfortunately, Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel have repeated this
mischaracterization. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1299 (arguing that
Justice White was “[w]riting for a plurality in Branzburg,”); see also id. at 1293, 1298;
Stephen Wermiel, Professor, Washington College of Law, Remarks at the American
University Law Review Symposium: Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech,
Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast”
hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the press: The growing use of
subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008)
(characterizing Branzburg as a plurality opinion). Whatever Justice Powell intended
by his brief concurrence, it is beyond dispute that he fully joined Justice White’s
opinion, and that it was the opinion of a five-Justice majority, not a plurality. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller) 438 F.3d 1141, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Justice
White’s opinion is not a plurality opinion of four justices joined by a separate Justice
Powell to create a majority, it is the opinion of the majority of the Court.”); In re
Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that in Branzburg Justice
Powell “wrote separately but joined in the majority opinion as the necessary fifth
vote”). The majority opinion squarely rejects the claim that there is a First
Amendment-based reporter’s privilege, at least in the grand jury context. Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 667.
6. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d at 1142. The CIA leak case
involved an investigation into which government officials may have improperly
disclosed to the press the fact that Valerie Plame worked for the CIA. Plame is the
wife of former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who had criticized the Bush
administration over the Iraq war. For a detailed discussion of the CIA leak case, see
Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of
a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 387–91 (2006).
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7

operative (“BALCO”) steroids investigation; the case in Rhode Island
where television reporter Jim Taricani was sentenced to six months of
8
home confinement for contempt after refusing to identify a source;
9
10
and the Privacy Act lawsuits filed by Dr. Wen Ho Lee and by Dr.
11
Recent calls for a shield law have been largely
Steven Hatfill.
spurred by these cases, particularly by the jailing of Judith Miller.
Virtually every article or argument in support of the privilege cites
12
these same few cases as evidence of the supposed crisis.
7. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (BALCO), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (N.D.
Cal. 2006). The BALCO case involved four individuals charged with the illegal
distribution of anabolic steroids and other performance enhancing drugs to a
number of professional athletes. Id. Two reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle
wrote stories that contained the confidential grand jury testimony of several
prominent athletes. Because the grand jury information had been subject to a
protective order, the judge asked the government to investigate who had leaked the
information to the press. The reporters refused to testify in the grand jury
concerning their sources, and the judge denied their claim of reporter’s privilege.
See id. They were held in contempt, but while their appeal was pending before the
Ninth Circuit their source was identified by other means and the government
dropped the subpoenas of the reporters. See Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits Leaking
BALCO Testimony, SAN FRAN. CHRONICLE, Feb. 15, 2007, at A1.
8. See In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2004).
Acting in violation of a federal judge’s protective order, a source gave Taricani a copy
of an undercover surveillance tape that was evidence in an upcoming corruption
trial. Taricani aired the tape, and the judge ordered an investigation into the leak.
Id. at 40–41. When Taricani refused to identify his source, he was found guilty of
contempt and sentenced to six months home confinement. H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra
note 4, at 63 (testimony of James Taricani); see Peter Johnson, Reporter Confined to
Home for Refusal to Identify Source, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2004, at 6A.
9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2002).
10. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Dr. Wen Ho
Lee is a scientist who was employed by the Department of Energy. From 1996 to
1999 he was investigated on suspicion of spying for China. He was indicted on fiftynine counts of mishandling classified information but was later allowed to plead
guilty to a single count. He filed a civil suit alleging that government agents had
violated the Privacy Act by improperly disclosing to the press personal information
about him and his status as a suspect. Id. at 55–56. After losing on their claims of
reporter’s privilege, id. at 64, the media companies whose reporters were
subpoenaed joined with the government to settle Dr. Lee’s case for more than $1.6
million. Paul Farhi, U.S. ,Media Settle with Wen Ho Lee, News Organizations Pay to Keep
Sources Secret, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A01. Five media organizations paid
$750,000 of this amount, even though they were not defendants in the case. Id.
11. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2007). Dr. Steven
Hatfill was named in the press as a suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks in Washington
D.C., although he was never charged. See Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104,
108–09 (D.D.C. 2005). He has filed a Privacy Act suit alleging that FBI and other
government officials improperly leaked information about him to the press. Id. Dr.
Hatfill has subpoenaed a number of reporters and news organizations to identify
their sources, and as this Article goes to press the litigation over their claims of
reporter’s privilege is ongoing. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
12. Two other recent significant cases generated less publicity and did not
involve compelling reporters to reveal the identities of confidential sources. In San
Francisco, freelance videographer Josh Wolf was held in contempt and jailed for
refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena for video footage that he shot of a
group of G-8 protestors. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Wolf), No. 06-16403, 2006
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These cases did generate a good deal of publicity, in part because it
is so rare for reporters to be subpoenaed. But despite the level of
publicity, they remain only a few cases. A handful of cases over
several years is more a trickle than a deluge, given the countless
thousands of newspaper, television, radio, and Internet news reports
filed every day. Walter Pincus, a veteran investigative reporter for the
Washington Post who was subpoenaed in both the Valerie Plame and
Wen Ho Lee cases, was closer to the mark when he wrote that these
recent high-profile cases represent merely a “blip” in the number of
13
subpoenas issued to reporters.
Privilege advocates who repeatedly invoke these same few cases as
proof of the flood of subpoenas are committing a common logical
fallacy known as “hasty generalization.” The error lies in generalizing
to an entire population based upon a sample that is too small to be
meaningful. Examples would include arguing, “Joe, the Australian,
stole my wallet. I guess all Australians are thieves,” or “The plane that
crashed was being flown by a woman. I guess women don’t make very
14
good pilots.”
By way of analogy, consider that there are more than a dozen shark
15
attacks on swimmers in the United States each year. Each attack
may generate some publicity, and no doubt each is an important
event to those involved. Nevertheless, we don’t conclude there is a
crisis because everyone recognizes that, relative to the total number
of swimmers each year, the number of shark attacks is very small. By
the same token, a couple dozen federal subpoenas to journalists over

WL 2631398 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006). In the other case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit denied a claim of privilege and held that prosecutors could
subpoena the telephone records of two New York Times reporters, including Judith
Miller, to investigate who in the government may have improperly leaked
confidential law enforcement information to the press. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2006).
As this Article goes to press, a new subpoena controversy has arisen. James Risen, a
reporter for the New York Times, received a subpoena from a grand jury in
Alexandria, Virginia, apparently seeking information about his confidential sources
for a book he wrote in 2006 about the CIA, State of War. This case will have the added
wrinkle that although Risen works for the Times, the subpoena relates to his book,
not to any reporting he did for the newspaper. Risen’s attorney has said he intends
to fight the subpoena. See Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for
Book Chapter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A17.
13. Walter Pincus, Commentary, Walter Pincus Sees Shield Law as ‘a Bad Misstep’,
NIEMAN WATCHDOG, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=218.
14. See NICHOLAS CAPALDI, THE ART OF DECEPTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL
THINKING 118–19 (1987) (describing the hasty generalization fallacy).
15. See Brian Handwerk, Shark Facts: Attack Stats, Record Swims, More, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, June 13, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2005/06/0613_050613_sharkfacts.html.
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the past few years do not, without more, signify a crisis, given the
enormous number of stories being reported every day.
Privilege proponent and former Solicitor General Ted Olson
provided a recent example of this fallacy in an op-ed piece in the
16
Washington Post. Olson claimed that it has become “almost routine”
for journalists to be subpoenaed: “From the Valerie Plame imbroglio
to the Wen Ho Lee case, it is now de rigueur to round up reporters,
haul them before a court and threaten them with fines and jail
17
sentences unless they reveal their sources.” Citing only two recent
well-known cases, therefore, Olson concludes that the extraordinary
circumstances of those cases are now “routine” around the country.
This makes for fine rhetorical flourishes, but it is a flawed argument.
These cases attracted so much attention precisely because they were
so unusual. It is simply false to claim that the exceptional is now the
norm.
There is surprisingly little data on exactly how frequently reporters
18
are subpoenaed.
Indeed, at the same time press representatives
were testifying before Congress that journalists were facing an
unprecedented flood of subpoenas that had reached “epidemic”
19
proportions, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press was
admitting on its website that “we simply cannot know for certain” how
many subpoenas journalists receive, or whether that number is on the
20
rise. Given this admitted uncertainty, it’s remarkable that journalists
would claim they are facing a crisis requiring congressional
intervention. One can only imagine how the press would react if, for
example, the Bush Administration claimed publicly that we were
16. Theodore B. Olson, Op-Ed, . . . Or Safeguards?, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at
A25.
17. Id.
18. It’s also important to recognize that the existence of a shield law will not
mean that federal subpoenas to the media will stop. The media still receive state
level subpoenas, despite some degree of statutory or judicial reporter’s privilege
protection in almost every state. See Kevin Rector, A Flurry of Subpoenas, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., Apr./May 2008, http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4511 (noting
that an upcoming University of Arizona study documents that state subpoenas to the
media are nearly ten times more common than federal subpoenas, even though
reporters have some legal protection in forty-nine states and Washington D.C.). A
federal shield law as shot through with exceptions and qualifications as the one
proposed will invite litigants to continue to serve subpoenas and argue that the
privilege does not apply in their case. At best, the law will mean that journalists will
be somewhat more likely to prevail at the end of such litigation than they are today.
The media will not be relieved of the burden of fighting such subpoenas altogether.
19. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 32 (testimony of Lee Levine, Levine
Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP).
20. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS:
THE REPORTERS’ PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL COURTS, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and
_subpoenas.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS].
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facing a “deluge” of new terrorists in our midst, while admitting in
other documents that it really had no idea whether or not this was
true.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) attorneys are required by regulation
to seek the Attorney General’s approval for subpoenas to the media,
and to demonstrate that the information is essential and all
21
reasonable alternatives have been exhausted. Data from the DOJ
indicates that, on average, there have been about a dozen DOJapproved subpoenas to journalists each year over the past six years,
22
and that number has been declining. DOJ subpoenas that actually
seek confidential source information are even more rare, averaging
23
only about one a year since 1991. As far as the DOJ is concerned,
24
therefore, evidence of a deluge is lacking.
Other information concerning the number of subpoenas to
25
For
reporters is largely anecdotal and potentially misleading.

21. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007).
22. See SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS, supra note 20.
23. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (testimony of Rachel L. Brand,
Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice)
(testifying that only nineteen DOJ subpoenas to the press for confidential source
information have been approved since 1991).
24. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that these numbers might be
misleading because the DOJ regulations supposedly do not apply to special
prosecutors, and “[m]any of the most widely reported cases of press subpoenas
involved special prosecutors.” Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1306, see id. at
1320. They don’t list the “many” cases to which they are referring. I am aware of
two: the CIA leak case, and the case involving the subpoena to Rhode Island
reporter Jim Taricani. In both of those cases, the courts found that even under the
DOJ regulations the subpoenas would have been proper. See In re Special
Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he short answer is that a
government prosecutor could have subpoenaed Taricani consistent with the
[Attorney General’s] regulations.”); In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp.
2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Assuming, arguendo, that the DOJ guidelines did vest a
right in the movants in these cases, this Court holds that the DOJ guidelines are fully
satisfied by the facts of this case . . . .”). Special prosecutors are rare, and those who
need to subpoena a reporter are even more so. It is wrong to suggest that there are
large numbers of special prosecutors roaming the country and subpoenaing
reporters in disregard of the DOJ guidelines.
25. One number that is often heard is that there have been more than forty
federal court subpoenas to reporters in the past few years. See Editorial, Shielding
Sources, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at A16; Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1319–
20; see also Lucy Dalglish, Executive Dir., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
Remarks at the American University Law Review Symposium: Left Out in the Cold?
The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20,
2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm#
(follow “webcast” hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the press: The
growing use of subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26,
2008). Even if accurate, this number is potentially misleading because more than
twenty of those subpoenas stem from only two cases: the Privacy Act suits filed by
Wen Ho Lee and Steven Hatfill. Other cases, such as the Valerie Plame investigation,
similarly involved subpoenas to a number of different reporters. Thus the total
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example, Eve Burton, general counsel to the Hearst Corporation, has
claimed that Hearst news organizations received about one hundred
26
It
subpoenas during a thirty-two-month period from 2005–2007.
would be a simple matter for Hearst to compile a list of those
subpoenas in order to bolster its arguments in favor of the privilege,
but no such list has been forthcoming. If we had such a list, we could
answer a few key questions. For example, how many of those
subpoenas were from state or local tribunals? The vast majority of
litigation occurs at the state level, and it is fair to assume that most of
27
the one hundred subpoenas were also from the state level. A federal
privilege statute would not affect state subpoenas, and so the
presence of such subpoenas does not support the need for a federal
28
law. Claiming there have been a hundred subpoenas likewise tells
us nothing about the circumstances underlying each subpoena. For
example, how many were really serious attempts that resulted in a
court battle, and how many were half-hearted or impulsive efforts by
an attorney who backed down as soon as the journalist’s lawyers
29
objected? How many of these subpoenas sought the identity of a
source or other truly confidential information, and how many merely
sought peripheral information or material that had already been
30
published and was not confidential? Finally, given that Hearst is one
number of cases where subpoenas to the press are an issue is far smaller than the total
number of subpoenas.
26. See Lori Robertson, Kind of Confidential, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June/July 2007,
1, 28 (quoting Eve Burton); see also Eve Burton, Gen. Counsel, Hearst Corp.,
Remarks at American Society of Newspaper Editors First Amendment Summit (Jan.
18, 2007), available at http://www.asne.org/files/mpeg/fas/propanel11.mov (last
visited Apr. 10, 2008) (noting that Hearst media companies received about eighty
subpoenas over a two-year period).
27. See Rector, supra note 18 (discussing University of Arizona study’s finding that
state subpoenas to the media are vastly more common than federal subpoenas).
28. Some might argue that a federal shield law would still be important in state
cases because it would demonstrate a national policy and commitment that might
have persuasive force in such cases. This assumes that a litigant, who was not
deterred from subpoenaing a reporter by state shield laws or court decisions that
would actually apply, would somehow be deterred by the moral force of a federal
statute that would not apply. This seems very unlikely.
29. For example, in a recent case in Seattle, a lawyer in the City Attorney’s office
issued three subpoenas to reporters for the Seattle Times asking them to identify
confidential sources in stories about police misconduct. When the paper objected,
the City Attorney withdrew the subpoenas a week later, saying he had not approved
their issuance. These three subpoenas would no doubt appear on a list compiled of
subpoenas issued to the media, even though they were quickly withdrawn, led to no
litigation, and did not result in the press being required to reveal any information.
See Gene Johnson, Seattle Drops Subpoenas for Newspaper, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5,
2007.
30. For example, litigants or prosecutors may occasionally subpoena a television
station for a copy of a report that was aired on the station, in order to help them in
an investigation or trial. This is material that was publicly aired and is not
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of the largest media companies in the world, one can legitimately
question whether an average of less than one subpoena a week
nationwide is really as staggering a number as Burton appears to
31
believe.
Even if one could establish that the overall number of subpoenas to
the media has increased in recent years, this would have to be
considered in light of the changed media environment. At the time
32
Branzburg v. Hayes was decided in 1972, the media consisted largely
of three television networks, local newspapers, and radio. There has
been an explosion of new media outlets since that time. We now live
in an era of 24/7 non-stop news coverage streaming from the
Internet, cable television, and satellite transmissions, in addition to
the more traditional print and broadcast formats. The media is more
pervasive and more intertwined with our lives than ever before.
Given the huge growth in the number of media outlets and formats,
33
as well as in the number of proclaimed journalists, it would be
remarkable if the overall number of subpoenas to the media was not
rising. However, such an increase in the number of subpoenas would
not necessarily indicate a change in the legal landscape. If there are
ten times as many journalists as there were thirty years ago, then even
if there are ten times as many subpoenas, things are simply staying
34
about the same.
confidential, but will likely still require a subpoena, which presumably would show
up on a tally of the total number of subpoenas received.
31. According to the Hearst website, the company publishes twelve newspapers
and nineteen U.S. magazine titles, owns twenty-six television stations, and is also
involved in numerous other media and entertainment activities in the United States
and overseas. Hearst Corporate Site, http://www.hearstcorp.com (last visited Apr.
10, 2008). If forty subpoenas a year were evenly spread among the Hearst
companies, that would be less than one subpoena a year per domestic newspaper,
magazine, or station. Again, not much of a deluge.
32. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
33. This is particularly true in light of the explosive growth of the Internet, and
of the huge number of bloggers and ordinary citizens who may now have a right to
call themselves journalists in a medium that barely existed only a decade ago. See
infra notes 92–109 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of the Internet and
definition of a journalist).
34. There was reference at the Symposium to an upcoming study by a University
of Arizona law professor that will purport to document the number of subpoenas
received by the media in 2006. Remarks at the American University Law Review
Symposium: Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the
Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.ed
u/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast” hyperlink next to “Censoring and
prosecuting the press: The growing use of subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield
legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008); see Rector, supra note 18 (discussing the
forthcoming study). It remains to be seen how useful the data from this study will
be.
A potential problem is that the study apparently relied upon media
organizations voluntarily to return a questionnaire about any subpoenas received,
and the response rate was about thirty-eight percent. The study then apparently
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As columnist Jack Shafer recently noted in Slate, “The First
Amendment lobby would have you believe that journalists are being
35
buried alive in [subpoenas], but that’s not the case.” The widely
held belief about the epic flood of subpoenas to the press appears to
be a myth.
MYTH #2: REPORTERS ARE ROUTINELY SUBPOENAED AS A FIRST CHOICE
OR EASY SHORTCUT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION
Another popular claim by those who support the federal shield law
is that it is now common for lazy prosecutors or litigants to subpoena
journalists as a quick and easy way to obtain information and shortcut
the need to investigate a case themselves. For example, Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) recently argued
that the federal privilege is needed because “the press has become
the first stop, rather than the last resort, for our government and
36
private litigants when it comes to seeking information.” The facts
suggest otherwise.
In general, it is nonsense to suggest that subpoenaing a reporter
can be a shortcut to obtaining anything. Far from being quick and
easy, subpoenaing a reporter is almost certain to slow down a case
dramatically, with no guarantee that the relevant information will
37
even be discovered in the end. The party issuing the subpoena can
extrapolates from the number of subpoenas received by the respondents to assume
that the nearly two-thirds of media organizations that did not respond also received
subpoenas at the same rate. Rector, supra. This is a flawed methodology, for it is at
least as likely that those who actually received a subpoena were more motivated to
return the questionnaire, and many of those who failed to return it did so because
they had received no subpoenas and did not feel it was important to respond. It’s
also unclear what information the study will contain concerning such issues as
whether the subpoenas called for confidential source information or merely for nonconfidential information or material that had already been published or broadcast.
Finally, because the study apparently considers only one year, it is unclear whether it
will be able to document whether or not the number of subpoenas received by the
media has been on the rise.
35. Jack Shafer, We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Shield Law, Part 1, SLATE, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2189186/ [hereinafter Shafer, Part 1].
36. Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Judiciary Committee
Chairman Urges Passage of Reporters’ Shield Law (Nov. 8, 2007),
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200711/110807c.html; see Editorial, Shield Law is
Crucial for Information Flow, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 24, 2008, at 6B (“In too
many instances, the subpoenas [to the press] are spawned by lawyers attempting to
take shortcuts in the discovery process to routine cases.”).
37. Privilege proponents Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel agree with this
point. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1336 (“Even today, a prosecutor or civil
litigant cannot run to the courthouse and expect to get a subpoena directing a
journalist to reveal their source without substantial cost and delay.”). To cite just one
example, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald’s investigation of the CIA leak case
was held up for more than a year while he battled with the New York Times and Time
over whether their reporters should have to testify concerning their conversations
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expect a lengthy and expensive legal battle as the journalist fights the
38
subpoena on various grounds. This battle may be financed by a
large media corporation, which can and will hire some of the best
First Amendment lawyers from the best law firms in the country. And
at the end of that long, expensive battle, even if the party seeking the
information prevails, there is a good chance the reporter will refuse
to testify anyway and will choose instead to be held in contempt of
court. Given any remotely hopeful alternative, a prosecutor or
litigant with any sense at all will pursue that alternative rather than
subpoenaing a reporter.
Department of Justice attorneys are required by internal
regulations to seek to subpoena a journalist only when they can
demonstrate to senior DOJ officials that the information is essential
to their case and that they have exhausted all other reasonable
39
alternatives.
For a DOJ attorney, attempting to subpoena a
with White House officials. It was widely reported that Fitzgerald’s investigation was
complete but for resolving the question of the reporters’ testimony. Once the
privilege dispute was resolved and Judith Miller finally testified, the grand jury
returned the indictment of Scooter Libby in about a month.
38. Although there is no federal shield law, journalists in federal cases routinely
oppose subpoenas by arguing that they have a common-law reporter’s privilege or,
despite Branzburg, that there is a privilege based on the First Amendment. These
arguments have met with varying degrees of success depending on the type of case
involved and which court is hearing the case. See C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE &
ROBERT C. LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 16-2, 16-3 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing
the status of the First Amendment and common-law privilege in federal court);
Eliason, supra note 6, at 392–99 (same).
39. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007). In response to a Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) request, the DOJ informed the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press that in recent years the Civil Division and Civil Rights Divisions have made no
requests to subpoena journalists, and that the only requests came from the Criminal
Division. See SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS, supra note 20. This suggests that the DOJ is not
making such requests lightly, and is generally limiting them to the most serious types
of cases.
The ACLU has claimed that the DOJ regularly “ignores its regulations in a
calculated effort to gag the press.” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PUBLISH AND PERISH:
THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL REPORTERS’ SHIELD LAW 12 (2007), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/freespeech/publishperish_20070314.pdf
[hereinafter
PUBLISH AND PERISH]. The ACLU cites no evidence to back up this charge, and I am
not aware of any that exists. The only case discussed by the ACLU where they
apparently believe the DOJ guidelines were not followed is the BALCO case. See id.
at 13–14. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel also criticize the subpoenas in the
BALCO case as failing to follow the DOJ regulations. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra
note 2, at 1305–06. They cite Mark Carallo, former press secretary to Attorney
General John Ashcroft, as calling the BALCO subpoenas “the most reckless abuse of
power I have seen in years.” Id. at 1306. This is a truly remarkable statement,
coming from a member of the Administration that gave us Abu Ghraib, secret CIA
prisons, “torture memos,” unlawful domestic surveillance, and other events that most
would consider to be just slightly more egregious abuses of power than issuing a
subpoena to a reporter.
In any event, the federal judge in the BALCO case—who, unlike the ACLU, Mr.
Carallo, and other critics, had access to the full record, including confidential grand
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journalist and complying with those regulations means additional
time, paperwork, levels of review and approval, and jumping through
various hoops to seek authorization from Washington. As a former
federal prosecutor, I can assure you that busy DOJ attorneys do not
eagerly seek out opportunities to complete additional paperwork and
seek approvals from Main Justice. If there are other avenues to the
information, they will be pursued, not only because the regulations
require it, but because any alternative means will almost always be
faster, easier, and more productive than trying to get the information
40
from a reporter.
There is another reason prosecutors will hesitate to subpoena a
reporter. As former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh once
noted, “Most prosecutors are very wary for a practical reason: You
41
don’t want to get the media mad at you.” Prosecutors have a strong
interest in maintaining good will and a reputation for fairness in the
community in which they work and from which their jury pools are
drawn. The media are hardly powerless to defend themselves if they
feel a prosecutor has stepped out of line. One need only recall the
savaging that distinguished career prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald
received at the hands of the media when he subpoenaed reporters in
42
the CIA leak case. This calls to mind the wisdom of the old adage
attributed to Mark Twain: “Never pick a fight with a man who buys
his ink by the barrel.” Prosecutors have little to gain, and much to
lose, by antagonizing the press with unnecessary subpoenas.
Private litigants who are not bound by the DOJ regulations are
similarly unlikely to subpoena a reporter except as a last resort. For a
civil litigant, just as for a DOJ attorney, trying to obtain information
from a reporter will not be quick and easy. Just ask Dr. Steven Hatfill,
who has been fighting for years to discover which government
jury materials—ruled that that the prosecutors had complied with the DOJ
guidelines. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (BALCO), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1121 n.9
(N.D. Cal. 2006). Likewise, although the subpoenas to the reporters in the Valerie
Plame case are often criticized, the judge in that case also ruled that the Special
Counsel had satisfied the DOJ guidelines. See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332
F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004).
The ACLU may not agree with the way the DOJ and federal judges interpret the
DOJ guidelines, but there is no evidence the regulations are being violated or
ignored.
40. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (testimony of Rachel L. Brand,
Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice)
(noting the rigorous requirements of the DOJ approval process and that it is
designed to deter prosecutors from seeking to subpoena journalists unless it is
absolutely necessary).
41. Shafer, Part 1, supra note 35.
42. See Eliason, supra note 6, at 412–13 & n.155 (discussing media criticism of
Fitzgerald).
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employees wrongfully leaked private information about him that
caused him to be accused in the press of the anthrax attacks in
43
Washington, D.C., in 2001. In addition, in those jurisdictions that
do recognize a qualified reporter’s privilege in civil or some criminal
cases, the courts generally require a litigant to demonstrate that all
other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted before the court
44
will consider whether to override the privilege.
Thus, private
litigants, for both practical and legal reasons, generally will subpoena
a reporter only when there is no reasonable alternative.
As evidence that the “shortcut” claim is a myth, we need only look
at the recent high-profile cases that have largely fueled the drive for a
federal shield law. In every one of those cases, without exception,
journalists were subpoenaed not as an easy first choice, but only
when, according to a federal judge, the party seeking the information
had exhausted all other reasonable options. This was true in the CIA
45
46
47
leak/Valerie Plame case, the BALCO case, the Jim Taricani case,
48
49
50
the Wen Ho Lee case, the Hatfill case, and others.
There is simply no evidence that prosecutors or litigants are now
seeing journalists as “the first stop, rather than the last resort,” as
Senator Leahy claimed. Most litigants are barred by regulation,
statute, or court rulings from pursuing such a course. Even those
who are not barred will, if they have any sense, look for alternative
means of obtaining information before picking a fight with a
reporter. Arguing that one should subpoena a reporter as a shortcut
to obtain information is akin to arguing that when driving from
Washington, D.C., to New York City one should take a shortcut
43. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 33 (D.D.C. 2007). Some four years
after filing his lawsuit, Dr. Hatfill recently learned the identities of some of the
government officials allegedly responsible for leaking information about him to the
press. This apparently was possible only because the officials released the reporters
they spoke to from their earlier pledges of confidentiality after the court ruled that
there was no privilege protecting the sources’ identities. See David Willman, Lawyers
Name 3 Officials as Leakers of Hatfill’s Name, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2008, at A7. Hatfill’s
privilege battles with other reporters continue as of this writing; former USA Today
reporter Toni Locy was found in contempt by the judge for refusing to testify about
her sources and is appealing that order. Hatfill v. Mukasey, 539 F. Supp. 2d 96
(D.D.C. 2008); see Eric Lichtblau, Reporter Held in Contempt in Anthrax Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2008, at A15 (describing the imposition of increasing fines if Locy continued
to violate the court order).
44. See DIENES, ET AL., supra note 38, § 16-2(e)(3) (discussing the standards
applied by courts that recognize the privilege).
45. See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004).
46. See BALCO, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
47. See In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004).
48. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2007).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2006).
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through Los Angeles. Once again, the facts don’t match up with the
rhetoric of privilege advocates.
MYTH #3: THE PRIVILEGE IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCES TO SPEAK TO REPORTERS
The key factual claim in support of the reporter’s privilege is that
the privilege is necessary to encourage confidential sources to come
forward and speak to reporters. This will, in turn, increase the flow
of information to the public and ensure a robust free press. In the
absence of a privilege, the argument runs, there will be a “chilling
effect” on confidential sources, and the flow of information to
51
reporters and to the public will dry up. Privilege advocates speak in
apocalyptic terms about this alleged chilling effect, claiming that
without a privilege reporters will be reduced to “spoon feeding the
52
public the ‘official’ statements of public relations officers.” This
claim is the very raison d’être for the privilege; indeed, the proposed
federal legislation—the Free Flow of Information Act—embodies this
concept in its title.
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court was skeptical of this factual
premise. The Court observed that the lessons of history suggested
53
Claims
the free press had always flourished without a privilege.
about “chilling effects” and harm to the press, the Court noted, were
largely speculative and consisted primarily of the opinions of
reporters themselves, and so “must be viewed in the light of the
54
professional self-interest” of those making the claims. Overall, the
Court concluded it was “unclear how often and to what extent
informers are actually deterred from furnishing information” when
55
reporters are compelled to testify. This skepticism seems as fully
56
justified today as it was thirty-six years ago.

51. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728–36 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment); Reporters’ Shield Legislation: Issues and
Implications, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Shield Hearing] (statement of the Honorable Richard Lugar, U.S.
Senate); id. (testimony of the Honorable Mike Pence, U.S. House of
Representatives).
52. Shield Hearing, supra note 51 (testimony of Lee Levine, Levine Sullivan Koch
& Schulz, LLP).
53. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668–69 (majority opinion).
54. Id. at 694.
55. Id. at 693.
56. Not all reporters agree that the alleged “chilling effect” is real. Walter
Pincus, an investigative reporter for the Washington Post who was subpoenaed in the
Valerie Plame and Wen Ho Lee cases, told reporter Jeffrey Toobin that he was
skeptical of the chilling effect argument and that “[m]y sources are not drying up . . .
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The strongest argument against the supposed chilling effect is
simply the argument of history. There has never been a federal
shield law, and investigative journalism in this country has flourished,
with no shortage of confidential sources. Watergate, Iran-Contra,
Abu Ghraib, secret CIA prisons, domestic National Security Agency
(“NSA”) surveillance—all of these stories and countless others were
reported through the use of confidential sources, and all without a
57
federal shield law. Even the images of Judith Miller being jailed and
forced to testify had no discernable effect on investigative reporting
58
or on the number of stories relying upon confidential sources.
One can grant that confidential sources are important to
journalism without agreeing that a shield law is necessary or
appropriate. In other words, it is a myth to suggest that reporters
can’t promise confidentiality without a shield law. It is important to
distinguish between a reporter’s promise of confidentiality to a
source and the existence of a legal privilege. As history makes clear,
reporters may promise sufficient confidentiality to encourage sources
to speak even in the absence of a privilege, simply by promising not
to name the source in a story and never to identify the source
voluntarily. In fact, if this were not the case and if the alleged chilling
effect were real, investigative journalism would have foundered long
59
ago for want of a federal privilege.
It’s reasonable to assume that most sources who wish to remain
anonymous are concerned primarily with not having their names in
the paper in a story the reporter writes the next day. They are not
[i]t hasn’t hurt me.” Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source, NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at
35.
57. Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, media lawyer Lee Levine
recited a long list of reporting that would not have been possible without
confidential sources: stories on the Pentagon Papers, the neutron bomb, Walter
Reed Medical Center, Enron, Abu Ghraib, and many others. The irony is that all of
these stories were reported in the absence of a federal shield law—and thus they
would not seem to provide much support for the argument that the shield law is
necessary. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 33, 41–46 (testimony of Lee Levine,
Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP).
58. Press reports about Abu Ghraib, secret overseas CIA prisons, and potentially
unlawful domestic surveillance by the National Security Agency all relied on
confidential sources, and all appeared while the Valerie Plame/Judith Miller saga
was ongoing.
59. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that only sources “dumb enough or
reckless enough to talk to a reporter without regard for his or her safety or wellbeing” would speak to a reporter in the absence of a shield law. Tucker & Wermiel,
supra note 2, at 1325. Every confidential source to speak to a reporter in the last
thirty-six years—including Woodard and Bernstein’s Watergate source “Deep
Throat,” Mark Felt—has done so despite the lack of a federal privilege. Either every
single confidential source since 1972 has been dumb or reckless, or Dr. Tucker and
Professor Wermiel are wrong about the need for a shield law to encourage sources to
come forward.
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very likely to be looking down the road and trying to evaluate
whether, two years from now, a judge might weigh the various terms
and exceptions of a shield law and compel the reporter to identify
them. To the extent they do consider that possibility, a reporter can
truthfully tell a source that, historically speaking, the chance that the
reporter will ever be compelled to testify is extremely remote. Any
reasonable concern for confidentiality may therefore be satisfied
simply by a reporter’s promise never to identify the source
60
voluntarily.
A perfectly reasonable and effective approach, in the absence of a
shield law, is for a reporter to promise a source that he will protect
the source’s identity to the extent legally possible, but will have to
comply if a court orders him to identify the source and all appeals of
61
that order are unsuccessful. Rhode Island reporter Jim Taricani,
who was convicted of contempt of court for refusing to identify a
62
source, recently described the types of promises he and his
employer now make to confidential sources. They essentially agree
that they will fight to protect a source as far as the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, but if they lose at that level they want the
63
source to agree that he or she may then be identified. Although
Taricani believes this is a terrible state of affairs, actually it is a very
reasonable agreement and should be all that any source can rightfully
64
expect. After all, the source is really doing no more than agreeing
that the reporter should obey the law by using all legal means to
protect the source, but complying with lawful court orders in the end
60. See Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 86 (2006) (statement of
Steven D. Clymer, Professor, Cornell Law School) (“Information flows to journalists
despite the absence of a federal statutory journalists’ privilege because sources rightly
perceive that there is only a very small risk that the government or a private litigant
will seek and a court will compel disclosure of their identity, or because they have
reasons for making disclosure that outweigh perceived risks.”).
61. I take issue with Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel’s characterization of my
proposal as an “empty promise of confidentiality.” Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2,
at 1327. Such a promise actually provides a very high degree of confidentiality, given
the relatively miniscule number of confidential sources who are ever revealed due to
litigation. The history of investigative journalism has shown that, far from being
empty, such promises of confidentiality are in fact more than adequate to encourage
sources to speak. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel also falsely frame the issue when
they say that a source in such a situation would “know that a journalist’s assurance of
anonymity will never be honored.” Id. at 1325. As history has shown, in the
overwhelming majority of cases the journalist’s assurance of confidentiality will still
be honored, even in the absence of a shield law.
62. In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 44–46 (1st Cir. 2004).
63. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 27.
64. Taricani also reports that so far his sources have had no problem with this
agreement. See id. It appears, therefore, that the arrangement troubles Taricani
much more than it troubles his sources.
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if that effort is unsuccessful. Again, this agreement guarantees a
great deal of confidentiality because the chances of the reporter
actually being compelled to testify are very small.
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that I am being
unrealistic when I say that sources will agree to talk to reporters even
in the absence of a shield law. They use the example of a
hypothetical government employee who learns of the Bush
Administration’s unlawful warrantless surveillance program, and calls
New York Times reporters Eric Lichtblau and James Risen to tell them
65
about it. In the absence of a federal shield law, they argue, the
reporters would not be able to assure the source of adequate
confidentiality and the source would refuse to talk to them. The
problem with this argument is that, in reality, such a source
apparently did contact those reporters, there was no federal shield
law, the source talked anyway, and the story was reported—and to my
knowledge, despite the grumblings of the Bush Administration, the
reporters have not been subpoenaed to reveal their sources for those
stories. It’s hard to see how this story supports the argument that a
shield law is necessary. What’s more, the proposed federal shield law
favored by Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel contains an exception
for leaks of information that have harmed or will harm national
security, which the government would certainly argue was true of
66
If sources are truly as skittish as Dr. Tucker and
these leaks.
Professor Wermiel claim, they could not feel comfortable that their
identities would be protected even if the federal shield law were
enacted.
According to an article by Lori Robertson in the American
Journalism Review, the Dallas Morning News requires reporters to tell
anonymous sources that in rare instances the reporter may be forced
to identify them if efforts to protect them are exhausted in a legal
67
dispute. Similarly, New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller has
said that some reporters now agree with sources they will protect
them to the extent legally possible, but if they lose a court fight they
68
There is no
are not going to go to jail to protect the source.
indication that reporters at those papers have suffered from a lack of
confidential sources. Robertson also describes the experience of
Fred Schulte, an investigative reporter for the Baltimore Sun for
twenty-five years. Schulte reports that he tells his sources he will
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1326–27.
See id. at 1335–37.
See Robertson, supra note 26.
See id.
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protect them up to the point of a grand jury investigation, but if he is
called before a grand jury he will have to testify. All of his sources
69
have agreed to these terms. Again, the purported evidence that the
chilling effect exists is largely anecdotal and unreliable, consisting of
a few reports of self-interested journalists. Most evidence is in the
form of affidavits of journalists submitted in various lawsuits,
affirming the importance of confidential sources and citing examples
70
where such sources were essential to their work. But considering
that all of the sources in these past stories agreed to come forward
without a federal shield law, such examples do not provide much
support for the argument that a shield law is needed. Such affidavits
may demonstrate that confidential sources are important to
journalism, but they also demonstrate, albeit unintentionally, that
reporters can develop confidential sources without a federal shield
law.
As evidence of the supposed chilling effect, privilege supporters
also like to cite a claim by the editor of Cleveland’s Plain Dealer that
the paper has withheld publication of two stories of “profound
importance” due to the fear of a leak investigation because the stories
71
rely on confidential sources. The trouble with this “evidence,” of
course, is that its veracity can’t be tested because the editor will refuse
to reveal the information necessary to evaluate his claim. Relevant
questions would include: What efforts has the paper made to go back
to the sources to probe how concerned they are about
confidentiality? What efforts have been made to develop additional
sources who may be willing to go on the record? And is the editor
really saying that if a federal shield law with its various exceptions and
72
qualifications were enacted, that would make all the difference?
69. See id.
70. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1168–69 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing affidavits of Judith Miller
and Matt Cooper); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (BALCO), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (listing affidavits submitted by journalists).
71. See NORMAN PEARLSTINE, OFF THE RECORD: THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND
THE WAR OVER ANONYMOUS SOURCES 131 (2007); see also H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note
4, at 33 (testimony of Lee Levine, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP) (citing the
same Plain Dealer anecdote); Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1323.
72. When the Plain Dealer anecdote is told, the editor of the paper is not reported
as claiming that if there were a federal shield law he would go ahead and publish the
stories—although that clearly is supposed to be the implication. Given the many
other ways that a source may be exposed, the exceptions in any proposed federal
shield law, and the uncertainty about whether any investigation would even take
place in a federal forum, it seems unlikely that the absence of a federal shield law was
critical to the alleged withholding of these stories. It is also interesting to note that
the claim with regard to the Plain Dealer was not that sources were “chilled” from
coming forward due to the lack of a shield law. The sources did come forward, but
the paper reportedly self-censored and refused to run the story out of fear of some
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Untested assertions such as those by the Plain Dealer editor may be the
stuff of lore within the journalism community, but such
unsubstantiated, isolated anecdotes provide a poor factual
foundation for proposed federal legislation.
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel essentially concede that this
supposed chilling effect cannot be established. They conclude that it
is “unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the lack of a shield
law causes a chilling effect” because “that is a policy decision left to
the legislative branch” and if Congress passes the shield law, the
73
courts will enforce it. This may be true, but it leaves unanswered the
question of just what Congress is supposed to rely upon when making
this policy decision, other than the desires of the large media
corporations lobbying for the law. The argument essentially boils
down to this: “We can’t really demonstrate that this law is necessary,
but the press wants it, and if we can convince Congress to pass it then
we’ll be home free.” This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the
legal merits of the shield law.
History demonstrates that reporters are able to guarantee sufficient
confidentiality without a federal shield law. As argued below
concerning Myth #4, of all of the risks of exposure that a source faces,
the danger that the reporter will be subpoenaed and compelled to
testify is probably the most remote. Privilege advocates are therefore
necessarily arguing that there are a substantial number of sources
who would willingly assume all of the greater and more immediate
risks of exposure by leaking information, but will be deterred from
coming forward solely by the most remote risk of all—the risk of the
reporter being forced to testify. Common sense and the historical
record suggest this is not the case. Some sources may well be afraid
of exposure, and may seek assurances of confidentiality. But these
assurances may be given without a privilege and, considering the
basket of risks a source faces, the presence or absence of a legal
privilege is unlikely to weigh heavily in a source’s decision about
whether to speak to a reporter.
MYTH #4: IF THERE WERE A SHIELD LAW, REPORTERS COULD
GUARANTEE SOURCES THEY WOULD REMAIN ANONYMOUS
A corollary of the argument that sources are chilled by the lack of a
privilege is the suggestion that, if we only had a federal shield law,

imagined future litigation—arguably an abdication of the paper’s responsibility to
inform the public.
73. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1324.

1360

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1341

reporters could guarantee sources they would remain anonymous
and thus sources would never be deterred from coming forward.
This is another myth. Leaking can never be made risk-free, and
reporters—at least if they were being honest—could never guarantee
sources that they would not be identified, even if there were an
ironclad, absolute privilege law.
A confidential source who decides to leak information to a
reporter faces a number of risks that she will be exposed. The
source’s company or agency may conduct an internal investigation to
74
discover the source of the leaks. Private lawsuits or government
investigations may lead to the discovery of the source’s identity
without testimony from the reporter. Others who know of the leaks
75
may come forward to expose the leaker. The reporter may decide
76
that the public interest requires that the source be disclosed, or may
77
identify the source inadvertently. Information in the story may allow
others to guess the identity of the source.
All of these risks exist whether or not there is a shield law, and
whether or not the reporter is ever compelled to testify. A reporter
simply cannot assure a source that he or she will never be identified.
There are too many ways for a source to be revealed that are out of
the reporter’s hands. This would be true even if there were an
absolute, ironclad privilege with no exceptions. In reality, of course,
74. In one recent case, a career intelligence officer was fired by the Central
Intelligence Agency for leaking classified information to reporters that ended up in
press reports about secret overseas CIA prisons. Her identity was discovered not by
subpoenaing reporters, but through an internal CIA investigation that included
polygraphing employees. See Dafna Linzer, CIA Officer Is Fired for Media Leaks, WASH.
POST, Apr. 22, 2006, at A1.
75. In the BALCO case, for example, another individual who knew about the
source’s contacts with the San Francisco Chronicle reporters decided to go to the
authorities and disclose those contacts. Thus the source’s identity was revealed
without testimony from the reporters themselves. See Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits
Leaking BALCO Testimony, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2007, at A1.
76. In a recent case in Virginia, a reporter revealed that a prosecutor had
improperly leaked to him damaging information about a state senate candidate, in
an apparent attempt to damage the candidate’s election prospects. The reporter
who revealed his source said he had decided that it was the “moral thing to do.” See
Jerry Markon, Prosecutor Accused in Tate Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2007, at B3; see also
Kathryn M. Kase, When a Promise Is Not a Promise: The Legal Consequences for Journalists
Who Break Promises of Confidentiality to Sources, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 565,
575–77 (1990) (discussing cases where journalists chose to expose their sources); cf.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (upholding a civil lawsuit brought
by a source against newspaper publishers who broke a promise to keep the source’s
identity confidential).
77. For example, reporter Jim Taricani, who was held in contempt for refusing to
testify and identify a source, later inadvertently identified his source when a
comment he made to an FBI agent allowed the agent to deduce the source’s identity.
Associated Press, Prosecutors Eye Contempt Charges Against Reporter’s Lawyer, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2004, at B4.
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any shield law passed by Congress will not be absolute; the proposed
Free Flow of Information Act is full of exceptions, qualifications, and
78
balancing tests. Even if that law were in place, therefore, reporters
still could not guarantee their sources that a judge would not
someday find that one of the many exceptions applied and the
privilege had to give way.
There is no doubt that some sources are worried about being
exposed. The fallacy is believing that the presence of a federal shield
law could ease those worries in any substantial way. A source has far
more serious and immediate risks to think about than the remote
chance that the reporter might be compelled to testify a year or two
down the road. It is a myth to suggest that a federal shield law would
allow reporters to put a source’s mind at ease and would thereby
increase the flow of information to the public.
MYTH #5: THE PRIVILEGE PRIMARILY PROTECTS INNOCENT
WHISTLEBLOWERS
Supporters of the reporter’s privilege argue that the privilege is
necessary in order to protect innocent whistleblowers and ensure
they will reveal important information they may have about
government or private misconduct. The reality, however, is that
innocent whistleblowers are seldom the ones who end up being
79
protected by a shield law. The privilege is much more likely to end
up protecting a source who is breaking the law by talking to the
reporter. The shield law thus ends up encouraging and sheltering
conduct that society has already determined should be unlawful.
Consider a classic whistleblower example: a Pentagon employee
calls a reporter to reveal information the employee has about
criminal conduct being engaged in by a defense contractor, with the
assistance of certain officials within the Pentagon. After talking to
the source and investigating further, the reporter writes the story,
indicating that a confidential source inside the Pentagon provided
much of the information. After reading the story, the U.S. Attorney’s
Office decides to open an investigation.
78. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1316–18 (arguing that an absolute
privilege would be “unworkable” and describing the exceptions to the privilege in
the proposed federal law).
79. The other flaw in this argument, of course, is the assumption that going to
the press is the only option for a whistleblower. Whistleblowers may report
information to law enforcement officers, agency inspectors general, or congressional
committees, and there are many statutory protections for whistleblowers. See, e.g.,
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H,
50 U.S.C. § 403q (2006) (providing protection to employees of the various
intelligence agencies who report wrongdoing to the relevant Inspector General).
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To hear privilege advocates tell it, one of the prosecutor’s first steps
would be to subpoena the reporter and try to compel her to reveal
her source. In truth, however, the DOJ regulations would not allow
the prosecutor to do that, and in any event it would be unnecessary.
Armed with the information in the story, the prosecutor, through the
use of the grand jury, has tremendous power to investigate the case.
She may subpoena documents, and subpoena and examine witnesses
under oath. There is no need to subpoena the reporter or to identify
the source because the source was simply conveying information
about the conduct of others, which may be investigated directly. The
same would be true of a private litigant who filed a lawsuit based on
the allegations in the story. Through the discovery process, lawyers
may obtain documents, depose witnesses, and use other methods to
80
As already discussed, for both legal and practical
investigate.
reasons, prosecutors and litigants are extremely unlikely to subpoena
a reporter when there are reasonable alternative ways to obtain the
information. In a true whistleblower situation, those alternatives will
almost always exist.
Now contrast the case of an innocent whistleblower with that of a
source who is himself breaking the law by the very act of providing
information to the reporter. Such a source is not simply passing
along information about the misconduct of others, which may be
independently investigated. The misconduct is the conversation with
the reporter itself. There are likely only two witnesses to that
misconduct: the parties to the conversation, namely, the source and
the reporter. Even if the identity of the source is suspected, the
source may lie, or may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege not to
testify. That leaves the reporter as potentially the only witness to a
crime or other misconduct. There often will be no reasonable
alternative way to obtain the information, which, as discussed above,
makes it more likely that a party will be forced to undertake the
burden of subpoenaing the reporter. If the reporter cannot be
compelled to testify, then the crime will go unpunished or civil
wrongs, such as Privacy Act violations, will go unredressed, and
81
wrongdoers effectively will be immunized by the privilege.
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 27–31, 33.
81. Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel take me to task for this argument, noting
that no one is legally immunized by the shield law and that I should be “more precise
in [my] use of terms.” Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1333. It is, of course, selfevident that formal legal immunity is not granted by the shield law. That is why—to
be precise—I have consistently said only that a shield law effectively immunizes some
wrongdoers, by making it impossible to obtain evidence from the only likely witness
to the misconduct—the reporter. See H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 52–63
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For evidence regarding who is protected by a shield law, we again
need only look to the recent high-profile cases involving reporters.
In every one of these cases, a reporter’s privilege would have
protected an alleged lawbreaker, not an innocent whistleblower. In
the CIA leak/Valerie Plame case, reporters would have been allowed
to protect White House officials who improperly leaked classified
information concerning the identity of a CIA agent and lied to cover
82
it up. In the BALCO case, the reporters would have been allowed to
continue to protect a defense attorney who committed perjury,
83
obstructed justice, and attempted a fraud on the court. In the Jim
Taricani case, the privilege would have shielded a source who violated
(testimony of Randall Eliason, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington
University Law School). If a law operates to make it virtually impossible to investigate
or charge someone, then they have been effectively immunized. I am not alone in
reaching this conclusion. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D.D.C.
2007) (noting that granting the privilege in Privacy Act cases “would effectively leave
Privacy Act violations immune from judicial condemnation, while leaving potential
leakers virtually undeterred from engaging in such misbehavior when the
communications are made to reporters”); Gabriel Schoenfeld, A License to Leak,
WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 22, 2007, at 20 (arguing that a shield law would effectively
immunize from prosecution those who unlawfully leak classified information to the
press).
82. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, Valerie Plame, the Spy Who Got Shoved Out into the Cold,
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at C1.
83. See Randall D. Eliason, Striking Out, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at 68. Dr.
Tucker and Professor Wermiel take issue with my criticism of the reporters in the
BALCO case. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1329–31. I have discussed
BALCO at length elsewhere and won’t repeat all of my arguments here. See Eliason,
supra, at 68; H.R. 2102 Hearing, supra note 4, at 52–63. The BALCO reporters
allowed their source to use them and their reporting as part of a scheme to obstruct
justice, and continued to protect and work with the source even after his scheme
became clear and after the public already had all of the relevant information
published by the reporters. Contrary to Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel’s
suggestion, Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1330, I have never argued that the
privilege is inappropriate because reporters may profit from their stories or advance
their careers. I have, however, argued that the particular actions of the BALCO
reporters demonstrate that application of a reporter’s privilege definitely does not
always serve the public interest.
One additional point about BALCO: Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel repeat
the argument made by many privilege supporters that the reporters were sentenced
to up to eighteen months in prison, which was a longer sentence than any of the
BALCO defendants received. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1306. This is
incorrect.
The reporters were not convicted of a crime, and thus were not
sentenced to anything. They were found in contempt for refusing to testify in the
grand jury. The typical sanction in such a case is to incarcerate the witness until
either he agrees to testify or the term of the grand jury expires. A grand jury typically
sits for a term of eighteen months, so any witness jailed for contempt could
theoretically be incarcerated for up to eighteen months if he continued to refuse to
testify (depending on when during the grand jury’s term the incarceration began).
This is not a “sentence,” because the witness would not have to serve a day in jail if he
simply complied with the judge’s order. Like all witnesses held in contempt, the
BALCO reporters would have held the keys to their own jail cell; any time spent in
jail would have been a result of their own choice. The BALCO defendants were not
so fortunate.
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a court order and acted in contempt by improperly leaking evidence
that was potentially damaging to the defendant in an upcoming
84
criminal trial. In the Wen Ho Lee and Hatfill cases, the privilege
would have protected government officials who allegedly violated the
Privacy Act by leaking personal information about suspects in a
criminal investigation, causing them to be tried and convicted in the
85
press and damaging their reputations.
Privilege supporters usually invoke the icon of the source as a
virtuous, innocent whistleblower motivated by a noble desire to
inform the public through the media. The reality, of course, is that
many sources are anything but noble, and anything but innocent.
Leaks to the press may be motivated by a desire for personal gain,
revenge, or to attack or smear an opponent. This is particularly true
in the nation’s capital: “Anonymous sourcing in Washington exists
today much more to protect government spinners than it does actual
86
whistleblowers.” The CIA leak/Valerie Plame case is just the most
famous recent example. Many sources are seeking to manipulate the
media and plant a story to further their own ends or attack an
opponent, and their journalistic enablers, eager for information, help
87
them along by freely promising them confidentiality. A reporter’s
88
privilege would encourage and shield such conduct.
Journalists argue, of course, that even if some misconduct is
shielded by the privilege, this is a necessary cost of protecting the
89
public’s “right to know.” But simply invoking this talisman does not
resolve the issue; the fact that information exists does not necessarily
mean that the public has a “right to know” it. My private medical and
financial information appears in a number of databases, but the
public does not have a right to see it. Similarly, many of these
reporter’s privilege cases actually involve information that the public
does not have a right to know. For example, the public has no right to
know the sort of confidential grand jury information that was leaked
to the press and published in the BALCO case. That is the whole
84. See In re Special Proceedings (Taricani), 373 F.3d 37, 40–43 (1st Cir. 2004).
85. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hatfill,
505 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
86. Toobin, supra note 56, at 35 (quoting Martin Kaplan, associate dean of the
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California).
87. See Howard Kurtz, Lashing Out from Under Cover: Hey, Play Fair!, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 2007, at C1 (criticizing the practice of political reporters allowing campaign
aides to attack other candidates while remaining anonymous).
88. Cf. John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist Critique of the Journalist’s Privilege, 23 J.L.
& POL. 115, 118 (2007) (arguing that the privilege would be bad policy because it
would leave executive branch officials free to leak, smear, or even lie without fear of
accountability).
89. See, e.g., Editorial, Time for a Shield Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2008, at A16.
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point of grand jury secrecy, which exists for a number of good
reasons, including to protect the privacy of witnesses and the rights of
those being investigated. The public did not have a right to know
that Valerie Plame was a covert CIA operative because that
information was classified to protect both her and the operations in
which she was involved. And, by definition, the public does not have
a right to know the type of private information that was leaked in the
Wen Ho Lee and Steven Hatfill cases, which is protected from public
disclosure by a federal statute, the Privacy Act.
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that some sources may
be chilled by the lack of a privilege, therefore, we must consider what
kinds of sources are most likely to be affected. True innocent
whistleblowers are almost never revealed through subpoenas to the
press and thus have the least reason to be concerned. Those who are
breaking the law by talking to the press are another matter. They do
run a slightly greater risk of exposure, and face more grave
consequences if they are discovered. Such sources might be
marginally more likely to be deterred by fear of exposure—which
means they would end up abiding by the law. In the Judith Miller
case, Judge Tatel, the judge most sympathetic to the reporters’
claims, observed that if those contemplating illegal leaks of classified
information are deterred by the fear of a reporter testifying, then that
90
is precisely what the public interest requires. Put another way, if the
Judith Miller case means that a senior White House official stops and
thinks twice when planning to attack a political opponent by leaking
classified information—that’s a good thing.
A shield law is most likely to be employed in cases where the source
is breaking the law, and thus ends up encouraging and protecting
conduct that society has already determined to be illegal and
undesirable. As a matter of policy, this makes no sense. As the
Supreme Court noted in Branzburg, sources engaged in criminal
conduct might prefer that there be a reporter’s privilege so they may
avoid detection, but that desire, “while understandable, is hardly
91
worthy of constitutional protection.” Nor is it worthy of statutory
protection.

90. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment).
91. 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).
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MYTH #6: THE LAW CAN ADEQUATELY DEFINE WHO IS A JOURNALIST
ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE
Any proposed shield law faces the challenge of defining who is a
journalist entitled to invoke the law’s protections. Given the rapidly
changing nature of journalism, this is a daunting task. Attorneys,
doctors, psychotherapists, clergy, and other professionals whose
communications are sometimes protected by a privilege all have
particular educational and licensing requirements that define the
members of the group, but anyone can call himself or herself a
journalist. There are no particular educational requirements and no
92
licensing exams. Indeed, some would argue that journalism is not
so much a profession as a process—the act of gathering information
93
to transmit it to the public.
Technology has broken down the practical barriers that once
existed between the professional media and the public. Thirty years
ago, in order to reach a mass audience one needed a job with a major
newspaper or network, or perhaps a book contract. Today, one
needs only an Internet connection, which is free at the local library.
Internet journalists or “bloggers” have exploded onto the journalism
scene. Many people now obtain their news from the Internet, and
94
many major stories are first reported on websites.
Internet
journalists are increasingly a part of the established media. For
example, during the recent trial of Scooter Libby, a portion of the
95
courtroom seats reserved for the media were allocated to bloggers.
Recent cases have also recognized that there is no legitimate basis for
96
distinguishing bloggers from more traditional journalists.
Another important development is the rise of so-called citizen
journalists. With the Internet, individual blogs, and sites such as
MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube, literally anyone can post
information of public concern and make the information available to
92. See Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 140 (D.D.C. 2005)
(“Reporters cannot be readily identified. They do not have special courses of study
or special degrees. They are not licensed. They are not subject to any form of
organized oversight or discipline.”); see also Miller, 438 F.3d at 1156–58 (Sentelle, J.,
concurring) (discussing practical and constitutional difficulties involved in defining
who is a journalist).
93. See SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW 6 (Free Press 2007).
94. See, e.g., Press Release, MSNBC.com, Internet Growing as News Medium, at
Times Exceeding Traditional Media Usage, http://www.msnbc.com/m/info/
press/02/0107.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
95. See Alan Sipress, Too Casual to Sit on Press Row?, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at
D1; see also PUBLISH AND PERISH, supra note 39, at 16 (citing other examples of
bloggers being treated as journalists).
96. See Lee, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 139–40; O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr.
3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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millions. Cable news networks such as CNN and MSNBC actively
solicit viewers to send in stories or video reports to be aired on the
97
networks or posted on the news organizations’ websites. A private
citizen who films an event with his cell phone and posts it on his
MySpace page is engaged in the essence of journalism. Given the
current state of technology, it is no exaggeration to claim, as does the
98
title of a recent book, that “we’re all journalists now.”
Even more than thirty years ago in Branzburg, the Supreme Court
noted that trying to define who was a “newsman” entitled to invoke
the privilege “would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a
99
high order” and would be a “questionable procedure.” A definition
that focuses on the function of journalism will, given today’s
technology, be extremely broad and will allow any individual, under
the right circumstances, to claim to be a journalist entitled to invoke
the privilege. Any such self-proclaimed journalist could unilaterally
decide to place certain information off-limits simply by agreeing to
promise confidentiality to a source. This would potentially exclude a
huge amount of information from the legal system, and would result
in substantial litigation costs as parties battled over the applicability of
the virtually boundless privilege. But a narrower definition of
“journalist” will result in legislative line drawing between different
First Amendment speakers, and will raise troubling constitutional
questions. Freedom of the press is an individual right, and a
fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is to protect all
speakers—not only the institutional, so-called “mainstream media”
but also the lowly street-corner pamphleteer (or, perhaps more
100
appropriate today, the lowly pajama-clad blogger).
The Senate version of the proposed federal legislation contains a
sweeping, functional definition of a journalist: the privilege may be
invoked by anyone engaged in journalism, which is defined as the
“regular gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording,
writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information that
97. CNN refers to these citizen stories as “I-reports”, see http://www.cnn.com/
ireport/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); MSNBC calls them “First Person” reports, see
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16712587/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); and on Fox
News, the citizen journalist submissions are called “U-Reports,” see
http://www.foxnews.com/us/ureport/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); see also
Howard Kurtz, Got a Camera? You, Too, Can Be a Network Reporter, WASH. POST, Sept.
24, 2007, at C1 (discussing the use of citizen journalists by the cable news networks
and concluding that “it sends a signal that anyone, not just well-dressed professionals
with good hair and a resonant voice, can be a journalist”).
98. GANT, supra note 93.
99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972).
100. See id. at 703–05; In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1156–57
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (quoting Branzburg).
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concerns local, national, or international events or other matters of
101
This definition
public interest for dissemination to the public.”
would appear to include most bloggers and other non-traditional
journalists, at least those who are “regularly” engaged in such
activities and are not one-time reporters. As such, it has the potential
for very broad application and for the shielding of a great deal of
information from the legal system.
The House version of the bill initially contained a similarly
102
Following hearings on the bill, the House
sweeping definition.
amended the definition of journalist to require that a person be
engaged in journalism for “a substantial portion of the person’s
103
livelihood or for substantial financial gain.” This is a valiant effort
to reign in the scope of the privilege, but what principle motivates
this definition? In terms of encouraging the flow of information to
the public, does it make sense to grant the privilege to a full-time
reporter for a small local paper with a few hundred readers, but to
deny it to a blogger who reaches millions but does so for little or no
compensation? The definition also invites additional litigation over
what constitutes a “substantial” financial gain or portion of a person’s
livelihood. What dollar figure or percentage of income is required
before Congress considers one a real journalist?
Any definition that attempts to separate the “real” journalists from
the others immediately faces constitutional difficulty.
Such a
definition will create two classes of First Amendment speakers: those
whose work Congress considers important or serious enough to merit
legal protection, and those whose work it does not. Any such
definition is likely to favor the traditional, established media at the
expense of lesser-known, and perhaps more daring or controversial,
upstarts. This congressional blessing of certain types of journalists is
difficult to square with First Amendment principles. Walter Pincus,
investigative reporter for the Washington Post, has argued that
allowing Congress to define who qualifies as a journalist means
104
“journalists are in effect allowing Congress to regulate them.” This
101. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 2035, 110th Cong. § 8(5) (2007).
102. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (as
introduced in the House, May 2, 2007) (covering “a person engaged in journalism”).
103. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (as
passed by the House, Oct. 16, 2007).
104. Pincus, supra note 13; see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The very task of including some entities
within the ‘institutional press’ while excluding others, whether undertaken by
legislature, court, or administrative agency, is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing
system of Tudor and Stuart England—a system the First Amendment was intended to
ban from this country.”); Miller, 438 F.3d at 1158 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (arguing
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also carries with it the risk that the political tides of the moment may
result in a definition that places certain types of speakers or
viewpoints at a disadvantage by denying them the privilege.
The proposed federal legislation lists a number of categories of
people and entities that will not qualify as “covered persons” deemed
to be journalists under the law. This includes those who are a
“foreign power or agent of a foreign power” (I guess Al-Jazeera is out
of luck? How about the BBC?) as well as those who appear on certain
105
government lists of suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations.
As Pincus aptly notes:
If this bill had been proposed in the 1950s, I guarantee “covered
persons” would not have included anyone associated with the
Communist Party or liberal organizations designated as fellow
travelers. In the 1960s and 1970s it probably would not have
included those associated with anti-Vietnam war groups or radical
civil rights organizations. . . . Think who could be added to that list
of uncovered persons by a future Congress when you talk about
depending on Congress to approve the shield law.”106

I find it very surprising that privilege supporters are apparently so
sanguine about handing over to the government the power to
determine who qualifies as a legitimate journalist and effectively to
107
“blacklist” certain speakers and exclude them from the privilege.
Large media companies, which are lobbying hard for the federal
shield law, have little interest in ensuring that the privilege applies to
bloggers or other non-traditional journalists, many of whom are their
competitors. They may well succeed in persuading Congress to adopt
a definition of journalism that grants the privilege primarily to the
traditional mainstream media or “professional” journalists. But such
a definition is constitutionally suspect and runs counter to all current
technological trends—it is a twentieth-century definition for a twentyfirst century world. It ignores the revolution that has fundamentally
altered the way the world receives and distributes information.
that extending the privilege only to a defined group of reporters risks the danger of
creating a licensed or established press).
105. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (as
passed by the House, Oct. 16, 2007).
106. Pincus, supra note 13.
107. See Jack Shafer, We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Shield Law, Part 2, SLATE, Apr. 16,
2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2189279/ (“Although the language [in the proposed
federal shield law defining a journalist] doesn’t sound onerous, journalists from
Third World and former Soviet bloc countries know all about the dangers of letting
governments define who is a journalist. I’m not paranoid enough to believe that the
clause in this bill will automatically lead to the mandatory licensing of journalists by
the federal government, but it is an excellent foundation upon which to build such a
card-issuing ministry of journalism.”).
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Indeed, the efforts of the mainstream media to enact a shield law may
be seen as an attempt to cling to power by obtaining legal recognition
108
for their rapidly disappearing “special” status. It’s as though horseand-buggy operators were seeking legal protections in the early
109
twentieth century, unaware that the world was passing them by.
MYTH #7: A SHIELD LAW WILL KEEP REPORTERS FROM GOING TO JAIL
A major rallying cry in support of the privilege is the claim that it is
a disgrace to see reporters in the United States behind bars. The
jailing of Judith Miller in the CIA leak case was a significant factor
behind the current push for a federal shield law.
Privilege
proponents cite the jailing of journalists in nations such as Burma
and China and criticize the United States government for behaving
110
the same way. Testifying before the Senate in support of the shield
law, Judith Miller piously concluded with a request that Congress
“help ensure that no other reporter will have to choose between
doing her small bit to protect the First Amendment and her
111
liberty.” But the claim that passage of a federal shield law will keep
reporters from going to jail is another myth.
It reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding both of the operation of a shield law
and of the reason that journalists go to jail in these disputes.
Imagine a lawsuit filed by a former prisoner at Guantanamo Bay,
alleging that American agents tortured him. A senior administration
official is called to testify concerning government policies on torture.
He refuses to testify, citing executive privilege. The court rules that
there is no applicable privilege, and orders the official to testify. The
official responds that, in order to preserve the constitutional
authority of the executive branch and to safeguard national security,
he will continue to refuse to testify, and is willing to go to jail if
necessary. How would most reporters react? Would they praise the
official as a hero bravely standing up for his principles through civil
disobedience? Or would they insist that the official follow the rule of
108. See id. (“Of the many flaws in the shield law, the most glaring is that it
imagines that the highest wattage of the First Amendment belongs only to the guild
that makes up the media industry.”).
109. Cf. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 529 (2002)
(arguing that changing technology may necessarily “put an end to special legal
treatment of the press”).
110. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S4800–01 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (remarks of Sen.
Lugar in support of the Free Flow of Information Act); PUBLISH AND PERISH, supra
note 39, at 1.
111. Reporter’s Privilege Legislation:
An Additional Investigation of Issues and
Implications: Hearing on S. 1419 before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(testimony of Judith Miller).
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law and obey the court’s order, and that he be jailed if necessary in
order to persuade him to testify?
Or imagine a civil suit filed against a newspaper for libel. A witness
called by the newspaper has evidence critical to the paper’s defense
but refuses to testify, claiming that the information was given to her
by her husband and is protected by the spousal communications
privilege. After a hearing, the judge rules that the claim of privilege
has no basis, and orders her to testify. She continues to refuse,
claiming that important privacy principles compel her to defy the
court’s order and she is concerned that, if she testifies, spouses in the
future may be afraid to confide in each other. Would the newspaper
praise her principled stand and agree that she should not have to
testify? Or would it seek to enforce the court’s order by having the
witness held in contempt and fined or jailed until she complies, or
seek some other sanction such as dismissal of the case?
The rule of law in this country means that courts, not selfinterested individuals, decide questions of constitutional law and
privilege. It requires that the final orders of the courts be respected
and adhered to by all citizens. This principle is fundamental to our
justice system. Even President Richard Nixon, hardly a poster child
112
for law and order, recognized the primacy of the rule of law. When
the Supreme Court ruled against him on his claim of executive
privilege and ordered that the Watergate tapes be turned over, Nixon
113
complied and resigned the presidency rather than defy the courts.
Journalists rightly expect that both government officials and private
citizens will obey lawful court orders, and justly criticize them when
they do not. The media rely on the courts and on respect for the rule
of law to protect them from unjustified libel suits, to prevent prior
restraints on publication, and otherwise to safeguard their legal
rights.
When it comes to the reporter’s privilege, however, many
journalists’ respect for the rule of law seems to take a back seat. If a
reporter asserts a privilege and a court rules that the reporter must
testify, many reporters will defy the court’s order, choose to be held
in contempt, and even go to jail, as did Judith Miller. And the rest of
112. This was aptly pointed out by Professor Wermiel during the Symposium. See
Stephen Wermiel, Professor, Washington College of Law, Remarks at the American
University Law Review Symposium: Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech,
Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast”
hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the press: The growing use of
subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
113. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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the media, rather than criticizing the reporter, will hail her as a hero,
give her journalism awards, raise money for her legal bills, and claim
that the press is under assault because they are being asked to abide
by the law like everyone else.
The CIA leak/Valerie Plame case provided a useful illustration of
this point. Two journalists and their employers—Judith Miller and
the New York Times, and Matt Cooper and Time Inc.—fought all the
way to the Supreme Court to argue that they should not have to
114
Every
reveal their White House sources to the Special Prosecutor.
115
federal judge to hear their arguments ruled against them. After the
116
Supreme Court declined to hear the case, Time Inc. chose to
comply with the court’s order and to turn over Cooper’s notes and
117
materials. The company issued a statement noting that “[t]he same
Constitution that protects the freedom of the press requires
obedience to final decisions of the courts and respect for their
rulings and judgments . . . . [O]ur nation lives by the rule of law
118
For this responsible course of
and . . . none of us is above it.”
action, Time was roundly condemned by Cooper and by others in the
119
journalism community.
The editorial page of the New York Times
pronounced itself “deeply disappointed” with Time Inc.’s decision to
120
For her part, Miller chose to defy the court’s
abide by the law.
order, and went to jail for nearly three months before relenting and

114. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).
115. Id.; In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004); In
re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004).
116. Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005); Cooper v. United States, 545
U.S. 1150 (2005).
117. See PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 113. Norman Pearlstine was at the time
editor-in-chief of Time, Inc., and made the decision to turn over Cooper’s materials.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 110–36. To their credit, Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel appear
to endorse the actions of Time magazine in turning over Cooper’s notes, and note
that reporters who violate lawful court orders should have to face the consequences.
See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1332. This is a commendable position.
Unfortunately, though, Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel are decidedly in the
minority among privilege advocates on this question. The overwhelming majority of
the journalism community condemned Time’s decision to obey the law, applauded
Judith Miller’s defiance of the court, and argued that the press was being unfairly
persecuted. See Pearlstine, supra note 71, at 110–36. Therefore I cannot agree with
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel that “[n]ews organizations . . . need to be given
more credit for their willingness to comply with lawful orders after they have
exhausted all appeals.” Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1332. As Time, Inc.’s
experience shows, such willingness is extremely hard to come by in the journalism
community.
120. See Editorial, Judith Miller Goes to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A22.
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121

agreeing to testify. The New York Times and most other newspapers
122
hailed Miller as a hero.
This double standard is indefensible. Reporters have every right to
claim a reporter’s privilege and to appeal any adverse court decisions
as far as they can. They do not have the right to decide that, once
their legal appeals are exhausted, they will place themselves above the
law and refuse to honor court rulings. Michael Kinsley, former
editorial page editor of the Los Angeles Times, has pointed out that
journalists are quick to criticize others who defy the law, and yet many
“believe passionately that it is not merely okay but profoundly noble
to follow their own interpretation [of the First Amendment] and
123
ignore the Supreme Court’s.” As the former editor-in-chief of Time
put it, “[h]ow . . . could we, as journalists, criticize others who
124
ignored the courts if we did so ourselves?”
The irony was best
summed up by Gregg Easterbrook, who wrote that the reaction of the
journalism community to Time Inc.’s decision to turn over Cooper’s
notes could be headlined: “BIG CORPORATION OBEYS LAW,
125
JOURNALISTS OUTRAGED.”
Journalists argue that they have an ethical obligation not to identify
their sources, and that court orders compelling them to testify place
126
If that is true, it is a dilemma
them in an impossible dilemma.
entirely of journalism’s own making. Reporters claim it is unjust to
ask them to break promises to sources that they will never identify
them under any circumstances. What they fail to recognize is that
127
they have no legal right to make such a promise in the first place.
It’s fine if journalists believe that their professional ethics require
them to maintain the confidences of sources.
But in other
professions, such as law and medicine, requirements of
confidentiality include the express or implied qualification that

121. See PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 121–48.
122. See Editorial, supra note 120.
123. Michael Kinsley, Constitutional Cafeteria, WASH. POST, May 5, 2006, at A19.
124. PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 98.
125. Id. at 139–40. For more examples of the few journalists who supported Time
Inc.’s decision, see id. at 137–40.
126. For example, Lance Williams, one of the BALCO reporters subpoenaed to
identify his sources, said that by asking him to do so the government was
“demand[ing] that I throw over my most deeply held ethical and moral beliefs, both
as a journalist and as a man.” Posting of Teri Thompson & T.J. Quinn to N.Y. Daily
News Sports Investigative Team Blog, Chronicle Reporters: We’ll Go to Prison if Necessary,
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/iteam/2006/09/chronicle-reporters-well-goto.html (Sept. 21, 2006, 22:45 EST).
127. See PEARLSTINE, supra note 71, at 122 (noting the argument of the Special
Prosecutor in the Plame case that “neither [Judith] Miller nor anyone in government
can promise confidentiality when the law doesn’t allow it”).
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confidences may be protected only to the extent legally possible. In
other words, there is a recognition that while engaging in one’s
profession and adhering to one’s ethical obligations, one must still
abide by the law—which includes obeying lawful, final court orders
finding there is no privilege in a given case. Journalism appears to be
the only profession that believes adherence to its own ethics may
include a duty to violate the law. Journalists cannot create an ethics
code that includes a requirement to violate the law and then act
surprised when the law objects.
Journalists in this country are not jailed for what they write, and are
129
not being censored when they are jailed for refusing to testify. This
is why arguments comparing journalists jailed in the United States to
journalists jailed in countries such as China, Burma, or Cuba are off
130
the mark.
In totalitarian countries, reporters are jailed for the
content of their work. In this country, if a reporter is jailed it is not
for what he or she has written but for refusing to abide by a lawful
court order, entered after due process of law and a full and fair
hearing. Rather than demonstrating that the United States is akin to
a totalitarian country, cases like Judith Miller’s demonstrate just the
opposite: that we are a society governed by the rule of law, and that
131
no one has a right to decide for herself what laws she will obey.
128. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) (requiring
confidentiality, but allowing lawyers to reveal information “to comply with other law
or a court order”).
129. As Professor Clymer and I both noted during the Symposium, the title of our
panel, “Censoring and Prosecuting the Press—An Assessment of Reporters’ Shield
Legislation,” was a misnomer. Censorship—the control of media content—is not an
issue in these cases. Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director of the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, agreed that these cases are not about censorship. See
Steven D. Clymer, Symposium Transcripts, Panel: The Role of Whistleblowers to Facilitate
Government Accountability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1220, 1220 (2008) (. . . [T]he issues about
the reporters’ privilege have nothing to do with either press censorship or with
prosecuting the members of the press.”); Randall D. Eliason, Professorial Lecturer in
Law at American University, Washington College of Law and George Washington University
Law School, Remarks at the American University Law Review Symposium: Left Out in
the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America
(Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/
symposia.cfm# (follow “webcast” hyperlink next to “Censoring and prosecuting the
press: The growing use of subpoenas and Reporters’ Shield legislation”) (last visited
Apr. 26, 2008); see also Dalglish, supra note 25.
130. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S4800–01 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (remarks of
Senator Lugar in support of the Free Flow of Information Act); PUBLISH AND PERISH,
supra note 39, at 1.
131. For the same reason, comparing reporters who are held in contempt for
refusing to testify to individuals prosecuted 200 years ago under the Sedition Act of
1798 is comparing apples and oranges. See, e.g., PUBLISH AND PERISH, supra note 39, at
3–5 (comparing recent subpoenas of reporters to prosecutions under the Sedition
Act). Those prosecuted under the Sedition Act were prosecuted for the content of
what they wrote. See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: A
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A shield law will not keep journalists out of jail. Any shield law will
have exceptions, which means there will be cases in which a court
finds that the privilege does not apply and orders a reporter to
132
If history is a guide, in many such cases the journalist will
testify.
refuse to testify, will be held in contempt, and will be sent to jail.
Given this history, one has to question why Congress should grant a
legal privilege to a group that will happily accept the benefits of that
133
privilege when they win but will defy the law when they lose.
Journalists go to jail not because of the lack of a privilege, but
because of their unique and arrogant notion that journalists, not the
Congress and not the courts, should decide what the law requires. As
long as that notion persists, journalists will continue to be found in
contempt and will continue to be locked up, even if the shield law is
passed. With or without a shield law, journalists can stop going to jail
134
tomorrow. All they have to do is obey the law.
MYTH #8: THE SHIELD LAW WILL PROTECT CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
135
INCREASE THE FLOW OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC
Consider the following cases:
• White House officials, in an attempt to punish a political
opponent, improperly disclose classified information concerning
his wife’s CIA employment, thus destroying her career and possibly
damaging a number of covert CIA operations. Prosecutors and the

BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11–21 (2007). This is not true for reporters who
are held in contempt for refusing to testify.
132. See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1316–18 (discussing the exceptions in
the proposed federal shield law).
133. Patrick Fitzgerald, the special prosecutor in the CIA leak/Valerie Plame case,
has suggested that any privilege Congress enacts should require that any person
seeking the protection of the privilege first submit the subpoenaed information
under seal to the court, to be turned over if the claim of privilege fails. Patrick J.
Fitzgerald, Shield Law Perils . . ., WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A25.
134. Journalists often claim that when they defy court orders to testify, they are
engaged in civil disobedience. See Editorial, supra note 120, at A22 (praising Judith
Miller’s “civil disobedience” and comparing her to Rosa Parks and Martin Luther
King Jr.). But journalists who work for powerful media companies are hardly
disenfranchised victims of an unjust legal system. They simply don’t like the result
the legal system has reached when it comes to the privilege. It is not true civil
disobedience to litigate within the court system with some of the best lawyers in the
country, expect your opponents to abide by the rulings of that system, and then defy
the rulings if you lose. That’s just gaming the court system and placing yourself
above the law. As Michael Kinsley has argued, if what Judith Miller and the New York
Times did can be justified as civil disobedience, then “almost any law anyone does not
care for is up for grabs.” Michael Kinsley, Op-Ed, Reporters Aren’t Above the Law, L.A.
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at M5.
135. Particular credit for the structure of the argument in this section goes to
Professor Clymer, who used a similar formulation during his remarks at the
Symposium.
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individuals harmed by these disclosures seek to discover who was
responsible.
• To protect the rights of defendants in a criminal case to a fair
trial, the judge places certain confidential case information under a
protective order. In violation of that order, someone in the case
discloses secret grand jury information, resulting in a storm of
negative publicity about the defendants and making it difficult for
them to get a fair trial. The judge who issued the protective order
wants to find out who is responsible.
• Government agents conducting a criminal investigation
improperly disclose information about a suspect that is protected
by the Privacy Act. As a result, the suspect is essentially tried and
convicted in the press of committing a heinous crime and his
reputation is destroyed, although he is never actually charged. He
wants to find out which government agents were responsible.

In these disputes, most would expect those dedicated to preserving
civil liberties to weigh in on the side of the criminal defendants or
private individuals who were damaged by the improper acts of
government agents. But of course, just the opposite is true. The first
example is the CIA leak/Valerie Plame case, the second is BALCO,
and the third is the case involving Dr. Steven Hatfill (or Dr. Wen Ho
Lee). In each case, civil liberties groups weighed in against the
interests of the individuals seeking to vindicate their rights and
discover which government agents had wronged them, and in favor
of allowing government officials and large corporations to keep that
information secret.
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and First Amendment scholar
Anthony Lewis recently noted the injustice that could result from the
application of a shield law in a case like Dr. Wen Ho Lee’s:
Suppose that a federal shield law had existed when Wen Ho Lee
sued to seek some compensation for his nightmare ordeal. The
journalists who wrote the damaging stories would have had their
subpoenas dismissed, and without the names of the leakers Lee
would probably have had to give up his lawsuit. Is that what a
decent society should want? Would that have really benefited the
press? Or would it have added to the evident public feeling that
136
the press is arrogant, demanding special treatment?

Many appear willing to sacrifice the civil liberties of those who are
injured by government officials or others in these cases, due to a
reflexive opposition to any subpoena to the press at any time, no
matter what the circumstances. As a result, in these privilege cases,
136. LEWIS, supra note 131, at 93.
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civil liberties groups side with large corporations such as the New
York Times Co. and Hearst, rather than supporting the individuals
who were harmed. But as Lewis points out, the press “is not always
137
the good guy.” What about a little consideration for the civil rights
of those who were injured? Why should Valerie Plame not be able to
learn who in the White House destroyed her career? Why should
people such as Dr. Lee or Dr. Hatfill be prevented from finding out
who injured them? Do we really want to encourage and protect such
improper and harmful actions of government agents?
Dr. Tucker and Professor Wermiel argue that prosecutors and
litigants in cases such as Valerie Plame or Wen Ho Lee seek the
identity of sources not from an altruistic desire to inform the public,
but because they want to prosecute the wrongdoers or seek legal
138
damages from them. That may be largely true, but it seems to me
beside the point. Regardless of motivation, the issue, according to
privilege advocates, should be whether the flow of information to the
public is enhanced. The position advocated by Professor Clymer and
me results in wrongdoers being punished, those who are injured
being able to recover for their injuries, and the public receiving
important information concerning unlawful acts by government
officials. The position advocated by shield law proponents results in
wrongdoers being protected and encouraged to commit illegal acts,
no remedy for those who are injured, and the public being denied
access to information about government misconduct.
The primary rationale for the shield law is that it will increase the
“free flow of information” to the public. In fact, just the opposite is
more likely to be true. As discussed above, the shield law is unlikely
to play any significant role in determining whether or not a source
comes forward. Without a shield law, investigative journalism using
confidential sources will continue to thrive as it has for decades. The
effect of the law, therefore, will more likely be to prevent the public
from learning additional information, particularly about individuals
engaged in wrongdoing through improper leaks to the press. The
privilege thus acts to slow or stop the flow of information to the
public, not increase it.
In the Plame case, the effect of a shield law would have been to
prevent the public from learning which White House officials had
improperly leaked classified information to the press and lied to
cover it up, and Scooter Libby would never have been brought to
137. Id.
138. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 2, at 1325.
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trial. In BALCO, the privilege would have prevented the public from
learning that a defense attorney had improperly disclosed secret
grand jury testimony, had lied to a judge about it, and had tried to
get his client’s case dismissed by blaming the government for the
leaks. In the Wen Ho Lee and Hatfill cases, the privilege would have
prevented the public—and the injured plaintiffs—from discovering
which government officials had wrongfully disclosed information
about them that was subject to the Privacy Act. In each case, rather
than providing the public with more information, the privilege would
act to allow journalists to deny important information to the public.
This is perhaps the ultimate irony of the proposed shield law. As
Michael Kinsley wrote about the Plame case, for all the grand talk
about the First Amendment, “This isn’t about the press’s right to
139
publish information. It is about a right to keep information secret.”
The law purports to ensure that the public will receive the greatest
amount of information possible concerning matters of public
importance. What it does instead is create a favored and privileged
class of unelected, unaccountable, journalistic arbiters of the public
interest, with the power to decide for themselves what the public
should and should not know.
CONCLUSION
Evidentiary privileges do have costs.
Every privilege keeps
potentially relevant information from finders of fact in a legal
proceeding, and has the potential to result in injustice. A law such as
the proposed federal reporter’s privilege, with its many exceptions
and qualifications, will also result in substantial litigation costs as
parties battle over its applicability. Before enacting such a law,
Congress should take care to ensure that it rests upon a solid factual
and legal foundation, and that the benefits of the privilege would
outweigh the costs. Privilege advocates have not met their burden of
demonstrating that the federal reporter’s shield law is needed or will
be effective.
The shield law continues to move through Congress, resting in
large part on the myths discussed above. Newspapers around the
140
country—which of course have a conflict of interest —editorialize in
139. Michael Kinsley, Op-Ed, Right Principle, Wrong Context, WASH. POST, July 10,
2005, at B7.
140. See Ryan Grim, WH Pushes Senators on Shield Law, POLITICO, Apr. 29, 2008,
available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0408/9937.html (noting that
some congressional staffers “refer to the shield bill as the Reporters’ Conflict of
Interest Act, since the same group that is reporting on its progress through Congress
could benefit from its passage”).
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favor of the bill, creating their own impression of a groundswell of
support. Members of Congress see a chance for an easy vote that will
please their local editorial boards and will allow them to paint
themselves as champions of the First Amendment. There is not
much of a constituency speaking out against the shield law. But it is a
bad and unnecessary law, based on false assumptions and sloppy
arguments, and will do more harm than good. Wrapping it in the
banner of the First Amendment and the free press won’t change that.

